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Abstract 
The presence of a Currency Board (CB) monetary system in Bulgaria is a key factor in 
assessing monetary policy transmission, since a CB implies no monetary autonomy. Using the 
SVAR technique according to the statistical properties of macroeconomic time series, we 
propose evidence sustaining the endogeneity of main Bulgarian monetary aggregates to 
shocks on the ECB interest rate. These results shed a new perspective over CB functioning. 
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 Non-technical summary 
 
The aim of this paper is to offer some new insights into monetary policy transmission in 
Bulgaria. The presence of a particular monetary (a CB) system is a determining factor in 
analyzing monetary policy in Bulgaria. Consequently, we explore CB functioning in Bulgaria 
and the implications generated by adopting such a monetary system. In particular, we 
concentrate on explaining how an exogenous monetary shock may be defined. 
 
We study in detail the economic hypothesis that allows for the SVAR identification and 
define a benchmark model. The estimations of our benchmark model conclude that both 
domestic interest rate and money follow the ECB dynamics in the medium-long-run only. In 
the short-run however, both aggregates exhibit a rather irregular response, and a possible 
explanation may involve their endogeneity. Effectively, under the CB in Bulgaria, these two 
aggregates are not “driven” by some institutional behaviour, which could elucidate why firms 
and households may take decisions which diverge from decisions that would have been taken 
in the presence of an autonomous Central Bank, as highlighted by Figure 2 and evidence from 
former Acceding Countries with no monetary policy autonomy (Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia). 
 
Moreover, even though output does not react in the short-run, our hypothesis in our SVAR 
excludes output stickiness. Consequently, this result can only be explained by an identical 
“time-to-build” interpretation, namely that agents influencing the real economy need time to 
collect enough information about future adjustments of monetary aggregates. Notice that our 
results remain highly robust when we control exogenous fiscal variables (public deficit or 
public debt) or when replacing output with real variables (private consumption, public 
expenditure, exports or imports). 
 
 
   4
1. Introduction  
 
        Understanding  monetary  policy  is  without  any  doubt  a  traditional  yet  very  active 
research field in economics. As it is generally accepted that monetary policy has deep effects 
on  economy, it becomes clear how important it is to acquire the necessary amount of 
information on them. This kind of analysis is synthesized in what is called the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. 
  Empirical and theoretical studies address the problem of monetary policy 
transmission, by trying to describe the different channels through which policy-makers 
‘decisions on monetary policy instruments propagate in the economy, as well as their impact 
on key economic variables (see, inter alii the classical contributions from Sims, 1982, 1992, 
Cochrane, 1994, Gordon & Leeper, 1994, Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans, 1996, Leeper, 
Sims & Zha, 1996, Bernanke & Mihov, 1998, or Bernanke & Blinder, 2002). We denote by 
monetary policy instruments different monetary exogenous  or  controlled variables, that a 
policy-maker can control and change in a discretionary way. For instance, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) controls and changes the refinancing interest rate, in order to (hope to) 
direct the economy on the desired path (for example, the ECB might raise the interest rate 
whenever anticipated inflation is too high, to induce a downward revision of these 
expectations)
1. 
As Taylor (1995) emphasized, traditional IS-LM Keynesian-based macroeconomic 
theory in a country with complete autonomy of monetary policy suggests that a tightened 
monetary policy, i.e. a discretionary exogenous raise in the interest rate or a decrease of 
money supply (growth rate), should diminish price growth (lower inflation), negatively affect 
output growth (via the negative effect on investment, thus on aggregate demand) and lead to 
an appreciation of the exchange rate (as higher interest rates increase domestic asset demand 
relatively to the demand in the rest-of-the-world assets). 
  However, little is known about monetary policy transmission in countries with a 
Currency Board (CB) monetary system. Indeed, in a CB, which implies a fixed exchange rate 
with an anchor-country, monetary authorities control neither the interest rate nor the money 
supply. Consequently, this raises a serious question in properly defining a monetary policy 
instrument. Thus, our first aim is to deal with this question using evidence from the CB 
                                                 
1 The actual evidence supporting the interest rate as the main monetary instrument must not obstruct the reader 
from knowing that for a long time monetary aggregates were used as the main monetary instrument. 
Furthermore, a recent study by Peersman & Smets (2001) confirmed the prominence assigned to monetary 
aggregates by an important number of Central Banks.   5
functioning in Bulgaria. Following this discussion, we emphasize some results derived from 
countries with monetary systems close to that of Bulgaria, i.e. with highly restricted monetary 
policy autonomy, namely Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Using these results as a background, 
we focus next on monetary policy transmission in Bulgaria. 
  Since the Bulgarian interest rate is not controlled by the National Bank, we must focus 
on a different source for monetary shocks. Following a discussion of this point, we select the 
anchor-country interest rate, namely the European Central Bank (ECB) interest rate in the 
case of Bulgaria, as the main source of monetary policy shocks (as in EFN, 2004) 
Furthermore, we study domestic monetary (the Bulgarian interest rate and money supply) and 
real (output) variable responses to shocks on the ECB rate, in a Structural VAR (SVAR) 
model in accordance with the statistical properties of our macroeconomic series. 
  Our results are twofold. Firstly, monetary variables responses are rather irregular 
(cyclical), which is in line with previous evidence on the CB functioning. Thus, in the absence 
of monetary policy autonomy, “traditional” domestic monetary instruments exhibit an 
endogenous behaviour relative to the anchor-country interest rate. Precisely, the Bulgarian 
interest rate follows the ECB interest rate in the medium-long-run only, while the two interest 
rates are rather disconnected in the short run, with money supply following a cyclical 
adjustment. 
  Secondly, our estimations imply that the real economy (output growth) exhibits little 
reaction to ECB interest rate shocks. However, this result is rather puzzling in the SVAR we 
propose, since ex-ante we suppose output lacks stickiness. Therefore, we conclude that this 
behaviour is also a characteristic of CB functioning, with the same explanation based on the 
incapacity or undesirability of agents (influencing real economy) to formulate short-run 
decisions in the absence of autonomous domestic monetary policymakers. 
  Further estimations investigate the robustness of our results, both including exogenous 
variables and different SVARs. Monetary variables conserve their above-described behaviour 
when controlling for fiscal variables, as the deficit or debt to GDP ratios. Furthermore, 
replacing output by other real variables in several SVARs yields traditional responses of these 
real variables, while monetary aggregates conserve their irregular response to ECB interest 
rate shocks. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we present the CB 
monetary system in Bulgaria and focus on the definition of an exogenous monetary 
instrument, and then we present some evidence from countries with little monetary policy   6
autonomy. Section three presents the data, our main results and checks for robustness, while 
section four concludes. 
 
2. Monetary system and monetary policy in Bulgaria 
 
On July 1
st ,1997, Bulgaria decided to introduce a Currency Board (CB), in order to 
stabilize the domestic economy after the important crisis of 1996-1997 (see, Berleman & 
Nenovsky, 2004, for a discussion on the Bulgarian crisis). In so doing, Bulgaria joined 
Estonia and Lithuania which introduced CBs anchored on ECU and USD in 1992 and 1994 
respectively, and to some extent Latvia, where the national currency is in a fixed peg with the 
SDR (a basket of currencies)
2. In accordance with evidence in the first section, this is 
definitely a feature to consider, if one tries to assess monetary policy effects in Bulgaria. 
  Pikkani (2000, page 6) summarized that “An orthodox CB Arrangement is an 
exchange rate arrangement whereby the monetary authority stands ready to exchange local 
currency for another (anchor) currency at a fixed exchange rate without any quantitative 
limits”. To be more precise, to supply foreign currency on demand, a CB implies a 100% 
backing of emitted domestic currency with foreign exchange reserves. 
Consequently, the CB in Bulgaria was very efficient in fighting the 1996-1997 crises, 
since a 100% backing of the domestic currency implies a 100% technical or non-political 
credibility, as monetary authorities cannot run out of reserves. In turn, full backing of the 
domestic base money and full convertibility at a fixed exchange rate assures a totally 
endogenous base money supply, with the automatic sterilization of excess liquidity
3. Indeed, 
any ceteris paribus change in money demand will induce changes in base money and the 
corresponding changes in foreign exchange reserves. 
As Lattemae (2003) explained, in a joint study on the CB systems of Estonia and 
Lithuania, in a CB there is no active monetary policy. Consequently, changes in the interest 
rate or monetary aggregates must not be defined as exogenous, as they mainly reflect 
endogenous development of the two indicators, subject to i) economic development, ii) 
external financing constraints and iii) different arbitrage conditions. Further, the CB can be 
understood as an automatic stabilizer, or, as Lattemae (2003) emphasized, “… [the CB should 
be seen as] a long-run relationship between monetary conditions and not as a rapid current 
account adjustment mechanism”. 
                                                 
2 Among other countries that used CB monetary system, we recall Argentina or Hong Kong. 
3 Niggle (1991) proposed a discussion on different theories analyzing the money stock endogeneity.   7
Yankov (2004) offered some additional insights into CBs, explaining that under 
pegged exchange regimes (as the CB) domestic interest rate should track closely the interest 
rate of the country whose money is used as anchor, i.e. the ECB interest rate for Bulgaria. 
However, Fase (1999) argued that the velocity of the convergence process (to the anchor 
interest rate value) essentially depended on the degree of integration of financial markets, 
because financial assets were better substitutes and capital tended to seek out the highest risk-
adjusted returns. Obviously, if there is a premium risk on the domestic economy, then the 
domestic interest rate should converge to the anchor interest rate plus the premium. 
 To  sum  up
4, neither monetary aggregates, nor the domestic interest rate can be 
considered as pure monetary instruments and used accordingly. In fact, under a CB as that of 
Bulgaria, the use of monetary policy is restricted to excess reserves exceeding the monetary 
base. The Central Bank can use the required reserve ratio, which of course impacts the 
economy through increased costs of financial intermediation. Overall, in terms of our future 
modeling, this implies that studying exogenous changes in either domestic interest rate or 
money aggregates, which is econometrically computable, has no coherent interpretation and 
should therefore be avoided. 
Thus, as our main interest is to study exogenous monetary shock transmission on the 
Bulgarian economy, we are left with mainly three types of shocks that can be considered as 
exogenous. The first, and most important, corresponds to exogenous changes in the ECB 
interest rate. As documented above, these changes should transmit to the Bulgarian domestic 
interest rate and further to all key macroeconomic variables. In our empirical analysis, we 
consider this experiment as the benchmark and most important. 
Secondly, remark that pegging against an anchor does not completely eliminate 
fluctuations, since the anchor can float against other trade partners’ currencies. A striking 
example is Lithuania, where starting 2002 the anchor was fixed against the EURO, while 
most trade is done with Russia. In this case, studying exogenous changes in the currency of an 
important trade partner (different from the “anchor currency” partner) might produce some 
interesting insights. 
Thirdly, we can try to use the required reserve ratio as an exogenous instrument, but 
variability in this indicator becomes econometrically interesting only in the last few periods. 
However, for countries as Estonia, there is an attempt by Nenovsky et al. (2001) to compose 
                                                 
4 For further evidence on the CB functioning, the reader is encouraged to consult the few (rather rare) theoretical 
models, including Pikkani (2000), Desquilbet & Nenovsky (2003) or Blessing (2007).   8
an index which will reflect changes in both the level and the base on which this ratio is 
interfering. 
Finally, in Bulgaria (as well as in Lithuania), the Government has an account (that 
may include, for example, revenues from taxes and/or privatizations) with the Central Bank, 
and resources in this account enter the official reserve accountancy. Thus, anytime the 
Government makes important deposits or withdrawals from this account, it implicitly changes 
the amount of official reserves, with potential effects on the economy. However, there is a 
definitely open discussion if changes in Government Account with the Central Bank should 
be considered as “monetary” shocks. In our view, they are clearly not monetary shocks, since, 
even if these changes affect first monetary conditions, and it is hardly conceivable that the 
Government should proceed to this kind of changes for monetary objectives (for example, to 
lower inflation expectations). For this reason, we abstain from considering this kind of shock 
as linked to monetary transmission issues, even if one could probably withdraw some 
interesting information from its analysis
5. 
 
Evidence from former Acceding Countries with monetary system close to Bulgaria 
 
From all former Acceding Countries, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have little (zero) 
autonomous monetary policy. Since their monetary systems are close to that of Bulgaria, 
former empirical evidence from these countries may therefore provide interesting insights 
with respect to our analysis in Bulgaria. 
Since 1992, Estonia has introduced a CB system anchored first on ECU, then on the 
EURO. Concerning monetary transmission, Lattemae (2003) found that external shocks in 
financial conditions, like ECB interest rate, were rapidly transmitted, in accordance to our 
previous evidence on the CBs. Following Bems (2001) and Ganev et al. (2002), Lattemae & 
Pikkani (2001) extended this analysis, as they concluded that effects on the real economy 
were small and short lived. Finally, evidence in EFN (2004) suggested that following a shock 
on the ECB interest rate, domestic interest rate increases, money decreased initially and had a 
cyclical movement afterwards, while output initially increased. 
  Lithuania was the second country in Central and Eastern Europe that introduced a CB 
monetary system, in 1994. The domestic money was first anchored to the USD, then to the 
                                                 
5 Similarly, we think that this shock can hardly be considered as a “pure” fiscal shock, since its changes 
influence monetary conditions first, before the real economy. As we have stressed before, we see this as an open 
discussion. Furthermore, quite paradoxically, it seems that this kind of shock is the most studied compared to the 
other three, as reflected by very interesting evidence in Nenovsky et al. (2001) or Nenovsky & Hristov (2002).   9
EURO in 2002. Recent evidence from Vetlov (2003) suggested that the high degree of 
openness of the Lithuanian economy made it rather vulnerable to the external environment 
(for example, shocks on the ECB interest rate). In a SVAR, EFN (2004) found that an 
increase in the ECB interest rate positively changed the domestic interest rate, with money 
decreasing, price exhibit prize puzzle and a counterintuitive short-term increase in output. In 
addition to the effects of the ECB interest rate and as stressed above, Vetlov (2001) identified 
important effects of the exchange rate. 
  Finally, since 1994, Latvia has adopted a fixed peg on the SDR with very narrow 
bands ( % 1 ± ), which in terms of exchange rate regime comes rather close to a CB. Evidence 
from Babich (2001) implied that changes in the ECB interest rate, contrary to variations in the 
exchange rate, had some impact on the real activity. However, these effects seem to be weak 
or non-existent. 
 
3. Evidence from monetary policy transmission in Bulgaria 
 
  The above evidence about monetary policy transmission in other CB countries 
suggests that i) effects are short-lasting and rather weak, ii) money may have some cyclical 
behaviour and iii) price exhibits the price puzzle. To investigate whether these results hold or 
not for the Bulgarian economy, we propose in this section a Structural VAR (SVAR) model 
on the series taken in level, since all series turn out to be integrated of order zero (cf. supra). 
Subsection one describes the data, subsection two discusses the benchmark case, while in 
subsection three we investigate the robustness of our results. 
 
3.1 Macroeconomic Data 
 
Data are quarterly and cover the period Q3:1999 until Q1:2007, leading to 31 
observations
6. Even if Bulgaria introduced  CB on July 1
st , 1997, we use data starting from 
the 3
rd quarter of 1999 to allow for variables to “stabilize” after this important shock. For 
example, changes in consumer prices (i.e. inflation) greatly oscillate between high values (i.e. 
65.7% change in Q1:1998 relative to Q1:1997) and negative values (i.e. -0.9% change in 
Q2:1999 with respect to Q2:1998). 
                                                 
6 Data for Q2:2007, Q3:2007 and Q4:2007 are only estimations. Therefore we did not include them in our 
analysis. However, we report that including these values does not qualitatively alter our results.   10
The most important feature of the CB in Bulgaria is that domestic usual monetary 
variables are not exogenous. Consequently, as stressed before, we consider in our benchmark 
model that monetary shocks come from the ECB refinancing interest rate. However, changes 
in the ECB refinancing rate are too rare to produce the necessary amount of variability in our 
analysis. Therefore, in line with other studies (see, e.g. Peersman & Straub, 2004, or Reynard, 
2007), we use the LIBOR  3 months interest rate( )
EU i , as the exogenous variable in our 
analysis. 
In our benchmark case, we study the impact of the 
EU i  on four variables. First, on the 
Bulgarian interest rate ( )
BG i , defined as the “money market rate”. Secondly, we consider a 
broad money indicator M3, namely the annual (quarter to quarter) growth rate in M3. To 
capture the effects on prices, we use the annual (quarter to quarter) growth rate of consumer 
prices (inflation π )
7. Finally, to look for some real economy effects, we consider Y  as the 
annual (quarter to quarter) growth rate of real output (GDP)
8. All these variables, as well as 
the LIBOR 3 months interest rate, come from the BNB dataset. 
The first step of the analysis is to look at the macroeconomic data univariate properties 
and to determine their degree of integration. Indeed, investigating the stationarity of the series 
is a crucial step to determine the correct multivariate econometric specification to implement. 
Theoretically, a process is either I(0), I(1) or I(2). Nevertheless, in practice many variables or 
variable combinations are borderline cases, so that distinguishing between a strongly 
autoregressive I(0) or I(1) process (interest rates are a typical example), or between a strongly 
autoregressive I(1) or I(2) process (nominal prices are a typical example) is far from easy. As 
many unit root tests are now available in literature, we have chosen to rely on the 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test (1992), to investigate which of the I(0), 
I(1), I(2) assumptions is most likely to hold. It is now well known that this test considers the 
null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative unit root hypothesis and is more 
powerful than the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. 
The results of the KPSS tests are not reported here because of limited space
9, but they 
can easily be summarized as follows, since clear patterns emerge from them. Indeed, the null 
stationarity hypothesis around a constant and around a linear trend root cannot be rejected at 
                                                 
7 Lavrac (2004) analyzed the role of inflation targeting in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and 
concluded that the best measure for inflation was “headline inflation rate”, i.e. the rate of change of consumer 
price index, and not inflation net of regulated prices. 
8 Of course, one might compute (for example the quarterly growth for GDP, i.e. the relative GDP change in one 
quarter with respect to the previous one. However, this might introduce some seasonality in our data. Series of 
Money growth and GDP growth are our own computations. 
9 They are available upon request.   11
the 1% significance level for all macroeconomic series under consideration. This leads us to 
conclude that all our series are properly characterized as an I(0) process
10. 
 
3.2 The benchmark model 
 
Hereafter, we implement an impulse analysis by calculating the impulse response functions 
(IRFs) to shocks, in a SVAR
11 on the series taken in level, since all series turn out to be 
integrated of order zero
12. 
 
In our benchmark case, we consider the transmission mechanism described in Figure 1 
below. 
 
Figure 1 – Transmission mechanism of a shock on the ECB interest rate 
 
 
 
The continuous arrows denote the transmission mechanism in our benchmark case
13. 
A EU interest rate ( )
EU i  shock is considered to impact first the Bulgarian interest rate ( )
BG i . 
Changes in interest rate 
BG i  (i.e. money prices) are supposed to affect money M3. Changes in 
money M3 further transit to consumer prices( ) π . Finally, real activity Y  (output) reacts last 
to initial changes in the ECB interest rate. 
                                                 
10 Note that this result must be taken with some caution given the small number of observations used for 
implementing unit-root tests (31). Indeed, attempts to conclusively prove the existence of such unit-roots usually 
require a great number of observations (over 100). In spite of this restriction, we think however that these tests, 
which we only apply for purely descriptive purposes, can propose a first indication on the statistical properties of 
the data. 
11 VARs were introduced by Sims (1980), while Hamilton (1994) textbook or Watson (1994) provided intensive 
evidence on the VAR technique. While the SVAR technique has recently been used for rather heterogeneous 
topics (Blanchard & Perotti, 2002, for fiscal policy, L’Horty & Rault, 2003, for the labour market, or Parent & 
Rault, 2004, in economic history), its application concerns mainly monetary policy effects (on consumption in 
Crowder & Wohar, 2003, on core inflation in Quah & Vahey, 1995, or on investment in Mojon et al., 2002), and 
in particular monetary policy transmission. This latter analysis appears in the seminal contributions from Sims 
(1982, 1992) or Blanchard & Quah (1989), as emphasized in a survey by Christiano et al. (2000). 
12 Furthermore, since all series of our database are integrated of order zero, the question of cointegration testing 
between those series is of course not relevant and hence do not emerge in this paper. 
13 Since the most important trade partner of Bulgaria is the EU, we disregard exchange rate effects. 
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  To reproduce the benchmark case, we use these constraints to achieve SVAR 
identification
14. First, to capture the transmission mechanism Y M i
BG → → → π 3 , we order 
the variables in this same order. Using a recursive identification (see Stock & Watson, 2001), 
this implies that shocks in 
BG i  (more precisely, responses of 
BG i  to changes in 
EU i ) 
contemporaneously affect 
BG i ,  3 M ,  π  and Y , changes in  3 M  contemporaneously affect 
3 M ,  π  and Y , changes in π  contemporaneously affect π  and Y , while changes in Y  
contemporaneously affect only Y
15. The second fact we want to reproduce is that 
UE i  changes 
are most exogenous. To capture this feature in a recursive SVAR, we order 
UE i  in the first 
position, implying that changes in other variables do not contemporaneously affect the ECB 
interest rate. 
Selecting this order entails a short comment. Remark that dashed curves in the Figure 
1 above denote our conviction that some uncertainty exists in the transmission mechanism 
from the Bulgarian interest rate onward, as one might suggest that transmission to  3 M  and π  
may be inverted. To test this assumption we also propose what we call the inverted SVAR, 
with these two variables in inverted order. 
We identify our SVAR using the Cholesky decomposition upon a lower triangular 
matrix. Impulse response functions were computed following a one-period shock equal to one 
standard deviation in the ECB interest rate in each SVAR. Confidence bands for impulse 
response functions were computed using the bootstrap method by carrying out 1000 
simulations. 
 Consider  first  the  benchmark case. To select the lag, Table 1 below reports the LR log 
likelihood test (column 1), and four information criteria: FPE final prediction error (column 
2), Akaike information criterion (column 3), Schwarz information criterion (column 4), 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion (column 5). 
 
Table 1 – Lag selection in our benchmark SVAR model 
Lag LR  FPE  AIC  SC  HQ 
0  NA  6.30e-19  -27.71989 -27.47992 -27.64853 
1 118.7921  1.46e-20  -31.52480  -30.08499*  -31.09667 
2 38.68064*  1.02e-20*  -32.09049  -29.45082  -31.30558* 
3 22.42913  1.61e-20  -32.27765*  -28.43814  -31.13596 
 
                                                 
14 In a survey, Stock & Watson (2001) recalled the mechanism used for SVAR identification. 
15 Of course, the SVAR technique implies that variables influence each other in lags.    13
  As illustrated by Table 1, three out of four information criteria prefer the lag 2 to the 
lag 1, thus we choose a lag 2 order for our benchmark model. Besides, our decision is also 
supported by the LR test, clearly suggesting the adoption of a lag 2 SVAR. Moreover, several 
test statistics have been calculated in order to check the quality of the multivariate estimation 
(Lagrange Multiplicator test (LM) and Ljung-Box test for serial correlation of order 16, 
ARCH tests (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity), Jarque-Bera normality test). 
The tests constitute a good way to detect the possible failing of some hypotheses made during 
the system estimation. In order not to make the presentation cumbersome, the results of these 
tests are not reported here, but they indicate that the SVAR model is well behaved and not 
subject to misspecification, since the usual hypotheses concerning the residuals of each 
equations are verified
16. Finally, the re-estimation of the SVAR by recursive least squares and 
the implementation of Chow tests confirm the stability of the parameters for the estimation 
period. Figure 2 below reports impulse response functions for our benchmark model. 
                                                 
16 The residuals of the VAR model equations exhibit good overall properties: except for some minor normality 
problems,  no sign of serial correlation exists and they are not of ARCH type   14
 
Figure 2 – Reaction of Bulgarian variables in the benchmark model 
 
  We observe first that an exogenous increase in the ECB interest rate initially increases 
the Bulgarian interest rate. However, the Bulgarian interest rate adjustment is very irregular. 
Money positively responds in the short-run, which is also counterfactual, but in accordance 
with EFN (2004). Instead, what is more important is that money adjustment is irregular 
(cyclical), similar to the adjustment of the domestic interest rate. 
Our interpretation of these two results is in line with the idea that both Bulgarian 
interest rate and money are endogenous with respect to external monetary shocks. Thus, the 
irregularities in their adjustment may be seen as a proof that adjustment in both aggregates 
takes time to stabilize, because, compared to the countries with some degree of autonomous 
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monetary policy, the BNB has no stricto sensu institutional impact on neither the domestic 
interest rate nor money. Lacking the information that this kind of institutional anchor is 
usually supplying, firms and households need more time to form expectations, and even their 
expectations might differ from those that would have been made in the presence of a Central 
Bank, which can explain the irregular movement in both the interest rate and money. Notice 
that our results are highly supported by empirical evidence in EFN (2004) for Estonia, a 
country where also the monetary system involves the presence of a Currency Board. 
Moreover, we represent in Figure 3 below the ECB Libor EUR 3 months interest rate 
( )
EU i , as well as the Bulgarian money market rate ( )
BG i , both in quarterly data for the period 
1999:Q3 – 2007:Q1. 
 
Figure 3 – The ECB Libor EUR 3 months and the Bulgarian money market rate 
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In accordance with our results in the SVAR benchmark, we remark that data described in 
Figure 3 confirm that for a certain period of time, the ECB and the Bulgarian interest rate 
were rather disconnected. 
  Another point that could sustain our results is that the domestic interest rate 
adjustment is more rapid, compared to evidence in EFN (2004) for former acceding countries 
with some autonomous degree for monetary policy (the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic 
or Slovenia). This can be a proof of rapid (however intense) absorption of foreign shocks by 
the domestic rate, which is also a feature that is usually defended in a CB monetary system as 
that of Bulgaria (see, e.g. Babich, 2001, Bems, 2001, or Vetlov, 2003).   16
Building on this interpretation for the behaviour of monetary aggregates, we can 
withdraw very interesting information about output behaviour. Notice that output does not 
significantly respond for around 3 quarters, which is again a very important result. Indeed, in 
our identification scheme, putting output last involves that we implicitly assume the lack of 
stickiness of output reaction, with respect to monetary shocks (changes in 
EU i ). Thus, output 
lack of reaction in our SVAR cannot come from a stickiness hypothesis, but is rather a 
stickiness result. To account for it, we turn back to the irregular adjustments in monetary 
variables. Because of this type of adjustment for monetary variables, real economy also reacts 
with some delay, because further information about the evolution of endogenous adjustments 
of monetary variables is needed. Thus, after a period close to 3 quarters, our estimations 
exhibit the usual decrease in output growth, but however this negative effect is absorbed more 
quickly compared to economies with higher monetary autonomy, but in line with results for 
countries under CB. 
To sum up, our results suggest that, as monetary variables are not controlled by the 
BNB (they are endogenous), firms and households may lack some information compared to 
the case where the behaviour of these two variables would somehow be constrained by some 
institutional interference. In this case, both domestic interest rate and money have an irregular 
adjustment, a result supported by real data in Figure 3, showing that domestic interest rate is 
disconnected from the evolution of the ECB interest rate. However, notice that this 
adjustment takes less time compared to more autonomous economies, a result that comes 
close to the evidence that CB economies adjust very quickly. In this case, output lacks 
reaction in the initial periods, which can be considered also as a “time-to-build-information” 
period for households and firms, concerning the evolution of endogenous monetary variables. 
Finally, output decrease is important, but its adjustments takes less time, reproducing the idea 
that external monetary shocks have short-lasting impacts on real activity in a CB. 
 
3.3 Robustness Tests 
 
3.3.1 The inverted model 
 
  With respect to the benchmark model, we have also considered the inverted model. In 
the inverted model we suppose that changes in the Bulgarian interest rate affect first prices   17
and then money, thus variables are ordered  Y M i i
BG EU , 3 , , , π . We report that considering the 
inverted SVAR does not qualitatively change our results. 
 
3.3.2 Exogenous variables 
 
In this sub-section we consider some experiments to check the robustness of our 
benchmark model. To do so, we estimate some SVAR models that include other variables as 
exogenous (outside the SVAR structure). 
First, we wish to investigate if introducing a world price variable may solve the price 
puzzle. Different simulations with either the variable external prices (defined as an average of 
oil, metal, non-food and food prices) or the variable world commodity prices do not allow to 
unambiguously conclude to the absence of price puzzle. In turn, we report that introducing 
these variables as exogenous does not change the impulse response functions following a 
shock in the ECB interest rate, compared to our benchmark model. 
  Secondly, we explore the sensitivity of our benchmark results with respect to the 
presence of some (exogenous) fiscal variables. First, we consider the ratio of public deficit to 
GDP, in quarter-to-quarter growth rate. Secondly, we correct the variation of the public debt 
to GDP ratio. Indeed, Bulgaria knew during this period a significant reduction in the public 
debt to GDP ratio, which exhibits a very pronounced negative slope. Thus, to correct the 
possible non-stationarity problems, we employ the first order difference of this ratio. As 
Appendix 1 confirms, our results are qualitatively unchanged when correcting these two fiscal 
variables
17. 
 
3.3.3 Effects on other variables from the real economy 
 
We consider next several SVAR models in which we replace output by other variables 
from the real economy. Precisely, we focus on private consumption, gross fix capital 
formation, public expenditure, imports and exports, all in quarter-to-quarter growth rate, all 
extracted from the BNB database. We report that our benchmark results are unchanged, 
therefore we represent exclusively the new variable introduced in the SVAR, which replaces 
output. For coherence, we consider the same order as in the benchmark SVAR. 
                                                 
17 Our results join evidence in EFN (2004), in the way that correcting for these fiscal variables does not allow to 
solve the price puzzle, except for Hungary and Poland but for none of the three countries with monetary system 
close to Bulgaria.   18
  In accordance with evidence in Appendix 2, following a positive shock on the ECB 
interest rate, private consumption decreases less than output, confirming that consumption 
adjusts smoother than output
18. Concerning public expenditure, we observe that following a 
raise in the ECB interest rate, government reacts counter-cyclically by positively adjusting 
public spending starting from the impact, in order to partially counterbalance the negative 
effect in output. Although the public spending raise is vigorous on impact, its persistence is 
rather reduced in time. Finally, imports and exports both positively react on the impact, which 
is somehow counter-intuitive. However, this result may be explained by the fact that these 
variables are highly coordinated in Bulgaria, since a major share of exported goods are 
produced with imported goods. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study is to offer some new insights into monetary policy 
transmission in Bulgaria. The presence of a particular monetary (a CB) system is a 
determining factor in analyzing monetary policy in Bulgaria. Consequently, we explore CB 
functioning in Bulgaria and the implications generated by adopting such a monetary system. 
In particular, we concentrate on explaining how an exogenous monetary shock may be 
defined. 
We study in detail the economic hypothesis that allows for the SVAR identification 
and define a benchmark model. The estimations of our benchmark model conclude that both 
domestic interest rate and money follow the ECB dynamics in the medium-long-run only. In 
the short-run however, both aggregates exhibit a rather irregular response, and a possible 
explanation may involve their endogeneity. Effectively, under the CB in Bulgaria, these two 
aggregates are not “driven” by some institutional behaviour, which could elucidate why firms 
and households may take decisions which diverge from decisions that would have been taken 
in the presence of an autonomous Central Bank, as highlighted by Figure 2 and evidence from 
former Acceding Countries with no monetary policy autonomy (Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia). 
Moreover, even though output does not react in the short-run, our hypothesis in our 
SVAR excludes output stickiness. Consequently, this result can only be explained by an 
                                                 
18 To find if investment is more volatile than output, we performed several estimations using the gross fix capital 
formation (GFCF). Unfortunately, GFCF is extremely volatile in the first quarters of the sample and our attempts 
to shorten the sample by disregarding these initial values did not produce conclusive results.   19
identical “time-to-build” interpretation, namely that agents influencing the real economy need 
time to collect enough information about future adjustments of monetary aggregates. Notice 
that our results remain highly robust when we control exogenous fiscal variables (public 
deficit or public debt) or when replacing output with real variables (private consumption, 
public expenditure, exports or imports). 
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Appendix 1 – Checking robustness with respect to the public deficit to GDP ratio  
  (the left column) and the public debt to GDP ratio (the right column) 
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Appendix 2 – Responses of several real variables to an ECB interest rate shock 
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Notes: 
- The 5 % confidence interval of each of the impulse response functions (IRFs) (represented by the two dotted 
lines on each graph) has been calculated using the bootstrap method by carrying out 1000 simulations. 
- The response of a variable of the system following a shock to another is given by the full line on each graph.  
- The fact that IRFs to shocks stabilize and come back towards zero indicates on the one hand, that the VAR 
model is correctly specified and on the other, that all macroeconomic series are integrated of order zero. 